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INTRODUCTORY.
Seeing and what is seen are. in the opinion of the common-
sense man. distinguishable facts of experience, it is true that
this distinction which he draws "between experiencing and that which
is experienced is not attended by any clearly conceived point of
difference. The questions; What is experiencing or consciousness,
and what is what you are conscious of, as apart from your conscious-
ness, of it, when pressed upon him in any given situation, throw
him into confusion. Nevertheless, the truth of the distinction is
to him indubitable.
It is our purpose to accept the common-sense man's convic-
tion that consciousness and object-of-consciousness are things that
we can and do know and proceed to find out what the nature of each
may be. What we shall have to say at the end of our investigation
will no doubt be somewhat startling to the common-sense man. And
this is to be expected, for we shall not attempt to give an ac-
count of something that is already familiar to him, but rather to
connect up with certain other facts the duality, consciousness-ob-
ject, which he is ascribing to experience. In a word, we shall
attempt to interpret this duality for him.
What we are chiefly interested in is the character of the
what-is-seen. or what-is-in-any-other-way-experienced. But siDce
we are taxing the seeing as not only coi related with the what-is-
seen, but as correlated with it in experience, it is necessary for
us to determine also what the seeing is, in order that we may dis-
tinguish the what-is-seen from the seeing.

But what justification is there for laboring upon the for-
mulation of the concept of objectivity? The common-3ense man will
tell us that he gets along very well with consciousness and object
undefined* And wny, if perform that labor we will, do we take the
common-sense man's vague notion of objectivity as our starting
point? In the following pages we shall attempt to answer these
questions, But even now we should HKe to make reply, if only in a
summary way. Upon the nature of objectivity rests the question cf
truth and the question of the validity of values of every Kind -
questions which the common-sense man and philosopher aliKe are un-
able to escape. And our answer to the second question is that if
we did not taKe as out starting point the common-sense man's notion
of object - namely something that is found in experience - we should
not have a starting point.
And now let us return to the common-sense man. Although he
is able to tell you neither what "consciousness" is nor what "ob-
ject" is, it is easy to discover that it is with reference to a
specific event that he maKes these distinctions. He defends his
assertion that he sees, hears, or otherwise experiences in a given
that
situation, by showing his eye3 are "looxing right at the object",
or that his ear is turned in the direction of the sound. To show
that his body is adjusted in a specific way and that he is able to
act appropriately is all that he feels called upon to do to maKe
good his assertion.
How a functioning physical organism becomes connected with
things, for him, in the way of being the experiencing of things,
can be traced out roughly, "in" ana "out of experience" is a
distinction that comes gradually. In the beginning of the child's

life it is out of sight, out of mind. When the rattle drops out cf
his view it is not followed up as something that is though not seen
Not until associations are formed does the notion of the "out-of-
experience" arise. Then the voice of the nurse arouses anticipa-
tions of the sight of her, and the sight of her anticipations of
the nursing bottle, etc.
A functioning physical body becomes singled out as the
prime factor in the event in which things come "into experience" as
a result of certain anticipated experiences failing to be realized.
For example, it is found that the delightful experience of grasping
the bottle or the rattle cannot be had unless the hand can be ex-
tended to the bottle or the rattle. And in another way also the
body comes tn be recognized as playing a leading part in experience.,
It is found that things vary for us from time to time in shape, in
size, in color, in agreeableness, etc., and that there is a con-
comitant variation in the condition or position of our bodies.
Out of this discovery that the physical body and its en-
vironment are on occasions most closely related grows, we believe,
the common-sense man's distinction between "consciousness" and
"object-of-conscioueness" . "Seeing" is for him the name for a cer-
tain form of bodily behavior, and a thing is a -seen ooject" by
virtue of being that to which the body, by behaving in the way of
••seeing" .becomes adjusted.
That the common-sense man does not always mean by "conscious
ness" and "obj ect-of-consciousness" adjusting body and environing
things, respectively, must be granted, lie reflects in his usage
of these terms a variety of philosophical doctrines that have been
bequeathed to him. What we are meaning to assert is that over and

above the many conceptions of consciousness and object which he has
inherited, so to speaK. he uses a conception which he himself has
formulated and which has reference to the connection between things
and a functioning physical organism*
In proposing to determine the nature of the duality, con-
S3icuarj ess
-object
.
which the common-sense man ascribes to experience,
we would have it understood, then, tthat we do not intend to attempt
to cross-section experience and study its structure. For we believe
that experience is an event and that it must be dealt with accord-
ingly. Which is to way that whatever distinctions are made in ex-
perience must be made in retrospect and as between the factors in
an event.
In a word, our problem is to determine the relation into
which the environment and the physical body enter when experience
occurs. We believe that the common-sense man taxes the event as
being much less complicated than It really is. And we should brln*:
this same charge against the philosopher. Indeed, if anything that
is, is wonderful, the manner in which the body and the environment
become joined in the event of experience may well fill us with awe.
The wonder is that we have been content to watch that union without
asKing any questions about it, or if we did asK questions, that we
have been satisfied with the single statement: Experience is depend4
ent upon a physical body.

5.
THE BEARING OP INTROSPECTION ON OBJECTIVITY.
in taking the stand, which we have in the preceding pages,
that the maxe-up or experience can be given ^nly in retrospect,
never immediately, we are opposing a great army of "experience" ex-
perts. T?e refer to those psychologists who hold that oy means of
introspection the nature of a given experience can be told even at
the moment of the experience and that what a given experience was
can, by the same method,, be told without referring to what that ex-
perience became.
This, unless we have misunderstoodProfessor Titchener, is
the doctrine implicit in a series of articles which he presented
last year on the question of introspection. 1 I assume .therefore"
,
in
to quote from one of those articles - "that introspection we are
describing a conscious process at first hand, or describing at
first hand the representative memory of a past process, or describe
ing from memory the way in which we placed* some past process at
2 g
the time of its occurrence." In asserting that a"conscious pro-
cess" cannot be given "at first hand- are we guilty of dismissing
an empirical fact "by a wave of the epistemological wand?^ 3
1 Amer. Jour, of Psych. Vol. XXI II.
2 Ibid. pJ+94.
3 Professor Titchener says, as regards another matter: "It is, how-
ever, worth noting as a sign of the immaturity of psychology and its
imperfect separation from philosophy, that the empirical difference
of free and controlled consciousness is dismissed, in certain mod-
ern dystems,by a wave of the epistemological wand". Ibid, p. 494. J
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Our reply is that our position represents not so much Hhe
waving of the • epistemological wand* as it does a refusal to wave
the "epistemological wand". Introspection, as .professor Titchener
taxes it, we are inclined to thinK. rests upon certain epistemolog-
ical assumptions which we - and to all outward appearances Pro-
fessor Titchener himself - are not willing to grant. These assump^
tions we shall attempt to bring to light.
Introspection. Professor Titchener would have us under-
stand, is a method of observation which differs from observations
made by physicists, chemists, and other scientists merely in its
"attitude and point of view". It is observation from the "stand-
point of descriptive psychology' . Its function is that of all
scientific observation, namely, to reconstruct. The Kind of re-
construction which it accomplishes is what we are most interested
in determining, as hearing upon this question the contrast which
tie draws between taKing experience at its face value and intro-
specting upon experience is significant. In the latter case we
"tease out the existential factors in the consciousness to be de-
scrib ed."
1
Another passage which bears upon this point runs as follows
"A half-trained observer, when he attempts to introspect upon a
given experience, often reports simply that he feels puzzled or
perplexed; but this reply, Professor Titchener tells us, is not
an introspective report, because it does not give the particular
•feels' that constitute perplexity for that particular individual;
1 Ibid. p. 490.
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the observer has given an introspective report whe*) the reader of
the report is able, from the report "to reconstitute, to recon-
struct, the perplexity which is therein described, precisely as it
was lived."
1
The reconstruction, then, is a matter of getting at the
"existential factors" of experience. A question might be raised
as to what is meant by existential factors", The bodily condi-
tions of an experience are in one sense "existential factors" of
experience. But this is not the meaning which Professor Titchener
gives to the term. The 'existential factors- which the observer
should "tease out" of the experience of bewilderment, spo<en of
above, are, he tells us: "localized organic and kinaesthetic pro-
cesses, affective concomitants, verbal ideas, etc." This list
makes clear that the factors to be ''teased out* 1 are psychological
rather than physiological in character.
a further characteristic of introspection which we should
notice is that though it reconstructs it does not change that with
which it works; it gives us experience "at first hand-. i^resum-?
ably this means that it gives us experience as it really is.
There is but one Kind of change which Professor Titchener can con-
ceive of introspection's working upon experience. To introspect
one must take a specific attitude toward experience. Now this
attitude might in some manner reflect -It self in the experience
that is being observed. But this possibility he believes need not
1 Ibid, p. 168.
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alarm us. for when a Habit or introspection is formed, if anything
is added by attitude it will settle down to a common supplement,
i.e.. it will become a "constant evror u
.
and hence will be negligi-
ble, indeed, there is every reason to beiieve, he holds, that the
attitude if it gets into experience at all. must inevitably, wfcen
introspection has been performed again and again, drop out entirely
This is what happens in the case of other processes again and again
repeated; we finally carry them on without attending to the fact
that we are carrying them on.
So much Frofessor Titchener tells us, with amplifications
which we have neither space nor time to present, concerning the
method and results of introspection. And what are our objections?
We can sum them up in one statement: the "viewpoint" of this Kind
of observation is that our so-completely-unified experience is only
an appearance of a more real multiple-part complex. This doetrine
is implied in the discussion at every turn.
t h.an
How else from this point of view can it be asserted that
verbal ideas, effective concomitants, Kinaesthetic processes are
the existential factors in the half-trained observer's experience
of bewilderment. It would be folly to say that the bewilderment
as he experienced it was all of these factors. For the half-
trained observer, at least, -we shall not be so bold as to say bow
it iti with the well-trained observer - these so-called factors are;
not in experience until after the experience of bewilderment. If
they were really inexperience before also, then surely experience
is not what it seems to be. And if it is not granted that the
observer fails to get these many factors when he feels the bewil-
dermen t . hen__ it li3 unmeaning to cail introspection reconstruction
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But if introspection is a process of reconstruction and for all that
gives experience "at first hand", what must be the aim of introspec-
tion, and what must be the nature of experience, only on the oondl-^
tion that there is the sham of appearance to be removed from ex-
perience before its real nature can be ascertained, can we under-
stand how introspection can be said to worK a change without worKing
a change.
That there is a more real form of experience underlying ex-
perience as we experience it, is made most prominent at one point in
Professor Titchener's account of retrospection. The observer has
given an introspective report on the experience of bewilderment, he
tells us, to return to that case again, when the reader of the re-
port is able to reconstruct the perplexity described in the report
"precisely as that perplexity was lived." Now profess ir Titchener
cannot mean that in order to be an introspective report the account
given of perplexity by the observer must be such as to cause the
reader to feel perplexed; or, if the observer were reporting on an
experience of fear, that the reader must be made to feel afraid. It
would be nonsensical to claim that the delineation of "Kinaesthetic
processes, affective concomitants, verbal ideas, etc., " could bring
about the Kind of re-living of the experience of perplexity which we
have just indicated. But if we suppose that the experience of per-
plexity is really Kinaesthetic processes, affective concomitants,
etc., then to re-live the experience of the observer from his lntro-|
spective report of his experience is another story.
The corallary of the doctrine that experience is mere ap-

pearance is a synthesizing mind that worxs upon the data of real
experience. If experience is really complex, though it does not
seem to be so. a mind is most obviously needed to account for the
fact that experience appears as it does. Whether we are willing
to involve ourselves with all of the problems which that Kind of a
mind bringswith it, need not be asKed.
.
That neither .professor
Titchener nor those who agree with him that by introspectiqn ex-
perience can be given -at first hand" would be willing to declare
allegiance to "mind" so conceived, we are safe in asserting. How,
then, have they been so misled as to have arrived at the point whcrd
they are forced to accept "mind".
The source of the trouble is, we believe, their total dis-
regard of the fact that experience is continuous, that any given
moment of experience is of one piece with the moment before and the
moment after it. Professor Titchener professes to stand with those
who assert the "going on of thought". However, his discussion of
"durativeness".» that attribute of the constituents of -consciousness^
which confers upon them their status of "processes", indicates most
conclusively that he is far from recognizing the full significance
of the 'going on of thought*. We shall quote at some length from
that discussion in order that his position may be clearly under-
stood.
"Th 3 experimental psychologist, if I understand him, means
by process something more than the abstract form of occurrence in
time; so that when we say, e.g., that perception is a process, and
speaK on the other hand of the process of growth, or process of de-
cay, we are using the word in different meanings. a process, in
.the P3ychologlcal_sen3e . is an item of experience to the nature of

which durativeness (if the word may be pardoned) is integral and
essential. It is true in the large, that all experience is tempor-j
al.. Yet there are numberless cases in which the progress of ex-
perience is so slow that its process-character may be ignored; we
then speax of 'things'. And there are other cases in which the
progeess is too fast for direct temporal apprehension; we then
speax of 'events*. Now it is characteristic of consciousness that
its constituents are typically processes, we may find analogies
in such experiences as a thunder storm, a luncheon, an address;
here is plenty of content, - heat and rain, thunder and lightning;
things to eat, and things to drinx, speeches and table decorations;
topics discussed, introduction and peroration; but it is of the
essence of the experience that it occupies a certain limited time;
and its description implies constant reference to this durative
attribute.- so it is with consciousness. Process is a relative
term; and there are times when a conscious complex is relatively
so stable that we are justified in applying to it the older term
•state of consciousness' or the more modern 'conscious formation 1 ;
just as there are times when the stream of thought is so rapid that
we speax of conscious 'events' or 'occurrences' Nevertheless,
Wundt and James are absolutely in the right when they emphasize the
'going on* of thought or idea; our descriptions of consciousness
if they are to be satislactory must be through and through tempop-
al i
; our vocabulary must be rich in words that indicate the passage
and course of time." 1
1
Ibid, p. 4-9 1*-.
_
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In ascribing to experience •durativeness* rather than the
••abstract form of occurrence in time", professor Titchener has
destroyed the 'going on ? of thought. Consider the character of
• durativeness'
. It is not time in which things develop, grow old,
and decay; these processes are peculiar to the abstract form of
occurrence in time. The constituents of experience are affected
by 'durativeness* only in the way of being given movement - some-
times rapid movement, and sometimes movement so slow that we are
justified in speaKing of states of consciousness 1 . Durativeness
does not produce in the constituents a change of character*
It becomes evident, then, that the 'going on ! of thought
cannot be a 'going on' that is Known. If the constituents of ex-
perience do not develop, do not change in such a way as to reveal
the fact that they cover time, how can they be Known as processes?
The beginning of a process, no matter how short the span of the
process, is gone before the end of the process has arrived. There-
fore, if the constituents do not, from point to point in their movef
ments, change in the way of showing what they have been in contrast
to what they now are, that they are processes can be Known only by
an on-looKing, non-temporal mind, which grasps both the past and
the present of the constituents.
But on this point we need not so greatly disturb ourselves
for it turns out that .professor Titchener* does not intend to con-
note by the term durativeness" that which is transitional in char-
1
"The abstract of occurrence in time 1 - is, according to professor
Titchener, a logical device, i.e., it is gotten by inference rather
than by experience.
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acter. For if he meant "by -durativeness" the carrying over of one
moment of experience into the next moment, he could not say that
the one way in which description from introspection might falsify
the "consciousness- upon which it worKs, is by allowing the attitude
of the introspector to creep in, If he really stood for transition
he could not fail to see that there is another and more serious
problem in giving at first hand" the description of any given ex-
perience, namely, the difficulty of giving the "all" of experience
at any moment when experience is at no moment complete. That he
should at no point in his discussion give mention of this problem
leads us to thinK that the attribute durativeness- is really tem-
poral only in name, which is to say that, despite his declared in-
tentions to do otherwise, Professor Titchener is taxing experience
as made up of static constituents.
He objects to ascribing to experience the Kind of time that
involves growth, decay, etc., on the ground that we do not experience
change but only changing contents, we insist that it is just this
Kind of time that should be ascribed to experience and for this
reason; while it may be that we do not experience change, we exper-
ience not only changing contents but also c.hanged contents. The
contents, if we may use that term as the name for what is experi-
enced»reveal a history. They reveal what they have been as well as
what they now are. Things we recognized, remembered, But how could
this be if there were not transition from experience to experience,
but instead "durativeness-
?
However, if the becomingness of experience is left out of
account there is no problem about breaKing experience up into dis-
tinct experiences and further breaKing those experiences up into pro-

cesses which are not processes, or. if one's vocabulary is not rich
in terms 'that indicate the passage and course of time,' of break ing
each moment of experience into 'focus' and'fringe', and th 3n again
dissecting the 'fringe'. But we have seen where this road leads
and not wishing to follow it to its end, we propose to attempt to
draw distinction in experience only in the way of finding what func-
tions are operative when the body and the environment join in the
event of experience.

1%
THE NATURE OF OBJECTIVITY.
The event or experience as viewed from the side of the
body is a distinctive kind of behavior, it is behavior which is
not purely mechanical, i.e., it is not pure reflex or pure habit.
Fhat distinguishes intelligent behavior is its lack of fixity and
its reference to ends.
If we remove the cerebral hemispheres from a frog what do
we discovery lie is able to perform all of the actions which a
frog with the hemispheres is capable of. But in order to react in
a specific way he requires a specific Kind of stimulus. Given
that stimulus, we know in advance how he will react. But when a
frog with the hemispheres is stimulated it cannot be foretold how
he will benave; he displays a flexibility, a variableness, in his
behavior that is foreign to the other frog.
And the flexibility of behavior thus displayed when con-
sciousness is present is controlled, is directed toward ends, in
contrast to pure habit where at each step there is a different
stimulus, and accordingly behavior is a mere succession of adjust-
ments, conscious oehavior is a continuous process of adjustment,
i.e., at each point it is in transition to a new adjustment. Let
us suppose an apple is placed in front of a child. His seeing it,
grasping it, raising it to his mouth and biting it, are not sepa-
rate and distinct acts of adjustment. The seen apple is incip-
iently being grasped, and .the grasped apple is being bitten before
it has reached the child'
s
' mouth. All of this is but a way of say4
lng that when consciousness- is present it is a uniquely changing
environment to which the body is keeping itself adjusted. Whereas

when "consciousness; is absent the body's successive reactions are
to an environment which does not possess this peculiar1 character
of flux.
The conscious situation, then, is characterized by a pecul-
iar Kind of change. The nature of this change may be described
more or less metaphorically by saying that it mirrors the future
as it goes. And this we assert because of the undeniable fact of !
felt identity. One moment of experience claims a preceding moment.
We are proposing that this felt identity be taxen as a fulfilmsnt,
as the culmination of a pr *cess, as a future, already foretold,
become realized.
The prophetic function of that which is experienced comes
to light most clearly in the problematic situation. There is a per-
iod of doubt and uncertainty, ending with the removal of the un-
certainty by the gaining of that which is sought. The end is Known
before it is acquired, is prophesied before it is reached. And the
end thus Known before it is Known, controls the whole process. The
search for a forgotten name is a case in point. Many names pre-
sent themselves but only one is chosen. And when the right name
does present itself it is welcomed as that for which we were looK-
ing all the time.
Now the Kind of change which things undergo when they fur-
nish us a problem which we struggle with and finally solve, Knowing^
the answer in a manner before it arrives - this Kind of change we
are taxing as typical of the change which things undergo in all
cases of experience. To taxe experience as having this phophetic
character maKes possible the explanation of certain occurrences
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which otherwise remain mysteries. That objects should be recog-
nized as things which have previously been Known, need not be takei
as a mystery or as a case of experience transcending itself. The
standing apart of what is doubtful from what is the datum, the un-
doubted, gives the duality of the object within experience, its
absent past and its present, And the coming of what was doubtful
into what it promised to be - suppose it is a book upon my table
whose ownership I am in doubt about and look on the fly-leaf for
my name which I find - this is recognition, an act of claiming the
present as belonging to the past without transcending experience
in so doing.
Ana now we are ready to raise the question: Into what
kind of relationship do the body and the environment enter in the
event of experience? If our analysis is correct, the environment
takes on the function of guiding the body. In ever being on the
wing and constantly displaying a goal, the experienced environ-
ment controls the body, controls it in the way of guiding it, in
as much as it not only calls out from the body specific acts of
adjustment but also makes each adjustment the beginning of another
act of adjustment; the seen apple is an apple that is on the way
to being grasped. But it must be born in mind that the terms
"guiding" and "control- are figurative. what we are trying to
make clear is that in the event of experience body and environment
vary concomitantly. The environment is as much in a state of
unstable equilibrium as is - the body. When the body acts in a
specific way, the environment is a specific kind of stimulus,
and. vice versa, when the envirom© nt is a specific kind of stim-
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ulus the "body acts in a specific way; and just as the body at the
very moment that it has become adjusted is on the way to a read-
justment, so also the environment at the very moment that it is a
specific Kind or stimulus is on the way to becoming a different Klnc
of stimulus.
This contention of ours that experience has the character of
flux is not a new doctrine. Whether in terms of -feelings of rela-
tions'1 , or an "act of apprehension
,
or a "diaphanous consciousness",
we find recognition of the fact that experience in some of its maKe-
up, at least, is elusive, non-describable, on the wing. But our po-i
sition differs from others in this respect: that which is on the
wing is not additive to the things experienced, the latter being
static In character. The becomingness permeates the things exper-
ienced. It is the things themselves that are changing. By virtue
of being on the way to becoming what they are on the way to becoming;
they are what they are in all of their uniqueness.
What we are asserting is, to state it boldly, that the en-
vironment, when experiences, has a fringe. It has a fringe in the
sense that it has certain uses which at any given moment are wholly
unxnown. This is to say that what any given situation is leading
to in the way of further adjustment between body and environment Is
not revealed by the given situation. Not until it has performed
its function, i.e., has led the body to a further purchase upon its
environment, can we determine what the given situation, or experience
was. But as performing the function that it is performing at any
given moment a given experience is just what it is. It is for this
reason that any neighbor's and my experiences are different, and no
two experiences of mine the same. The direction in which any given
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experience tends to lead depends upon past associations, habits,
and education, which are for no two of us the sane, nor for anyone
of us twice the same.
The fringe of which we are speaking is, then, radically
different from the fringe of which the psychologist speaxs. it is
a fringe that cannot be described" at first hand". To place the
feelings which a given experience leads to in the given experience,
as the psyehologist does, is to strip experience of its continuity,
and to raaKe a mystery of the continuity of the bodily behavior
which is correlated with experience. But the fringe which we are
ascribing to experience explains these two facts; that the things
experienced form a continuum, and that the body acts in a manner
that adapts it to a changing environment.
And this brings us in sight >f that for which we are maKingj
our search, consciousness is the fringe, the flux character of theii
experienced environment, the environment's function of leading the
body from one situation to another. The common-sense man's identi-
fication of consciousness with the functioning of the physical bodyf
alone is untenable; for the character of the activity of the body,
in the event of experience, is intelligible only when the unceasing
flux of the things experienced is brought into account.
What "object" is, if consciousness involves ooth body and
environing things, it remains for us to determine. .Its connotation
is in one sense, narrower than the common-sense man takes it to be*,
for him "object" is the experienced environment in its entire char-
acter. But it is not with the entire nature of the experienced
environment but rather with the experienced environment in abstrac-
tion from one of its characteristics that objectivity is to be
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identified. "Object" in other words, is a given experience taxsn to
abstraction from its transitional character. But a given experieicel
even as thus taxen involves a functioning physical "body, which is
to say that "object" has also a somewhat broader connotation than
the common-sense man givesit; for in identifying "object" with the
experienced environment he taxes the latter as having its character
without relation to the physical body.
The character that the environment has over and above hhat
of functioning in the way of maXing transition from situation to
situation is not difficult to state, for it is the character that
is most familiar to us, the character which we do not need to turn
philospher in order to discover. It is the character which the
environment has as being that to which the body has become adjusted.
For though the body is constantly becoming adjusted in the «vent of
experience, it i3 also at each moment adjusted. The body is ad-
Justed in the sense that it is controlled by a specific end or aim
of the environment. And all of this is but a way of saying that
"object" is the environment functioning in the way of holding up
ends for the behavior of the body.
The experienced environment has a focus as well as a fringe,
which fact gives us the basis for the distinction between conscious-
ness and ob,iect-of-consciousness. Its focus maxes of it not an
environment of selected parts but rather a total situation. At
this moment, for example, the "problem of objectivity", the weari-
ness of a warm day, the harassing practice of a bugler in a neigh-
boring house, are, not one, but all, an end for my activity - the
end, namely, of completing tnis thesis. With reference to that end

fighting my weariness, and "attending from "the bugle represent
adjustment, the presence of a focus in experience »as truly as my
••thoughts" on the problem of objectivity. For focus is another
name for the uniting of the various factorsof the environment in
a plan of action, in other words, the object designates the point
of departure at any given moment for the reconstructive process
which characterizes the conscious situation.
Consciousness and object are, then, the fringe and the
focus, respectively. They are correlated functions of the environ-!
ment. The environment in being "in consciousness' 4 performs the
function of leading the body from one situation to another; the
environment is Mobject"in holding up specific ends for bodily be-
havior, i.e., in presenting itself as tne "raw material" for this
peculiar form of reconstruction. It is the overlooking of the
two-fold function of the experienced environment that has given
rise, v/e believe, to the persistent problems of philosophy. "Ex-
perience has been treated as wholly "object" » its transitional
character being left out of account, with the result that "con-
sciousness" has in turn been denied, or itreated as something addi-
tive, or again, as identical with the sum-total of experience.
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THE DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENCE.
The conception of consciousness and object which we have
attempted to formulate in the preceding pages is in complete agree-
ment in certain respects with the doctrine of neo-realism. we
join with the advocates of that doctrine in asserting that "mind"
falls wholly within the realm of natural things. also hold in
common with the realist that what is "in mind" is neither created
nor monopolized by corning "into mind", in other words, we both
hold that what we experience antedates our experiencing it, and
that what is experienced oy any one of us is not hindered thereby
from being experienced by others also.
These points of agreement make prominent the fact that we
take radical issue with realism on the question of the independence
of objects. Objectivity, as we have defined it, involves a func-
tioning physical organism. It is the name for an adjustment of en-
vironment and body. Objectivity, as the realist views it, has no
necessary connection with a physical body. As professor perry
states the theory of independence it is: "Things may be and are
directly experienced without owing either their being or their ma-
1
Lure to that circumstance." just where do we part company with
the realist? By what diverging of paths does he arrive at
"thorough-going realism", to use professor Perry's appraisal of the
doctrine of independent objects, and we at thorough-going relativ-
ity?
1
Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 315. The section in which
this occurs is headed "Independence of experience or consciousness"
and by consciousness he tells us that he means selective response
^Q£JL^^^.lc^^im^lm-^^^^

The independence of ocjects is revealed by introspection,
according to some of our opponents. The sensations of yellow, for
example, according to the account of one of this number, contains
over and above "yellow" the element, "sensation", which is con-
tained also in the "sensation of blue" and in the "sensation of
green". This element, "sensation, which is common to all experience
is "awareness" or "consciousness" and a most unique element it is t
as the following account makes evident: "The moment we try to fix
our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is,
it se&ms to vanish; it seems as if we had before us a mere empti-
ness. - when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all
we can see is the blue; the other element is as it were diaphanous.
Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if
i
we Know that there is something to looK for."
That the discovery of the element ."awareness" , makes indu D-
itaole the independence of objects seems obvious enough to this
class of realists. The reasoning which they imply is that, that
which is as diaphanous, colorless, "the same-for-all", as awareness
is found to be, leaves the objects to which it becomes attached
precisely what they would be if it were not attached to them.
Why we cannot accept independence on these grounds, it is
not difficult to make clear. In the first place, any attempt <bo
argue from the findings of introspection is obviously futile. If
ones opponents declares that lie does not find the given element in
1
Gr.E.Moore: Refutation of idealism. Mind N.S. XII. p.4t>0.
— 1
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his experience - and this is the declaration which many who have
looKed for awareness have made - all argument is at an end. And,
further, even if it is granted that awareness and objects are dis-
tinguishable, it does not follow that they are independent of each
other. Shape and color are also distinguishable, but it does not
follow that at times they exist apart.
there is another realistic program, however, which we c-annot
so readily cast aside. Its procedure is so much lixe our own that
it requires the most careful scrutiny to determine at what point our
courses begin to run in contrary directions. Me refer to Professor
Perry's treatment of independence. He is opposed to studying M mlnd i;
by the introspective method. He proposes rathsr to view it "as it
operates in the open field of nature and of history.- 1 "Listening
and hearing", for example, "are operations of the living organism, or
specific operations of the nervous system which lie in the field of
general observation.
"
2
And this he tells us by the way of maXing
it clear that he stands for "a motor theory of consciousness," The
action of the body is neither antecedent noj? subsequent to mind,
but is instead, simultaneous with mind, or, better, the activity of
the body is a. part of the very maKe-up of mind - this is his conten-
tion. Not by having an element, "awareness", added to them, but sim-
ply by being "reacted to" in a specific manner characteristic of
the central nervous system," elements become "mental contents." 3
Mind, as thus viewed "in the open field of nature and his-
tory", he finds to be made up of these three components: "action,
Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 279.
J Ibid, p. 299.
3 Ibid. p. 285.
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interest, and contents-
,
i.e., body reacting, interests of the "body,
controlling the body's reaction » and environment reacted to." But
what is the nature of the "interest" and what is the nature of the
"contents"? We fully agree with professor Perry that "hearing is
an operation of the living organism", out we should iiKe to Know
something about the character of what is heard and what its rela-
tion is to the "operation of the living organism".
In answer to our question concerning the nature of mental
contents, we find the following passage: "It is with respect to
their grouping and interrelations that the elements of mental con-
tent exhibit any peculiarity, when my attention is directed to this
I find that mental contents, as compared, for example, with physical
nature, possess a characteristic fragmen tar iness. Not all of phys-
ical nature, nor of any given natural body, is in my mind, but the
peculiar abstract that is in my mind does not exactly coincide with
the particular abstract that is in my neighbor's mind. Furthermore,
the fragments of nature that find their way into my mind acquire
thereby a peculiar interrelation and compose a peculiar pattern." 1
From our point or view this is an excellent account of "mind 1
as given from the viewpoint of things experienced. Mental contents
do indeed possess a "characteristic fragmentariness- . We need only
compare any two or a few of our experiences to discover this fact.
Such a comparison serves to show us that the environment is always
a specific Kind of stimulus to the body but it is not permanently
1
Ibid, 0.^77.
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any one Kind of stimulus, as an Illustration of this, the surface
of my table is smooth and compact r when viewed toy my naked eye, tout
when I see it under the microscope it is rough and broken up into
Innumerable parts. The surface of the table as i get it with the
naked eye is fragmentary, for it is only one of the kinds of stimu-
li that the surface of my table is; and vice versa, the appearance
of the surface of the table under the microscope is fragmentary for
it is only the detailed character 4f the surface of the table, where-
as the surface of the table present itself to my body under another
i
character also. And again, the experience in which the two exper-
iences of the table are compared is fragmentary, for it shows only
the duplex character of the surface of the table, whereas we know
it is each of these characters singly, as well.
And we should also agree that the " fragments of nature- whid t
find their way into my mind "acquire a peculiar interrelation and
pattern", as compared with those that find their way into my neigh-
bor's mind; for the fragments in my mind are connected up and per-
meated toy my aims and purposes, those in my neighbor's mind toy aims
and purposes peculiar to him. A rock that I, an idle tramper, find
along the roadside "becomes, for me, a restlrg place, and then, os I
while away the moments, a thing upon which to scratch initials,
date, etc. But for a geologist who passes the same way, the rock
is a piece of limestone which becomes, through an investigation
which it directs, interrelated- with the cliffs at the foot of
which it rests.
It will toe observed that in adopting rrofessor Perry's ae—
j
count we are taking the -mental contents" as in a state of fiux, as
growing, as becoming, as continually setting new problems for the
body. "Grouping" and -pattern" we understand as the names for a
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temporal continuum which the things experienced form. In a word,
we understand the "peculiarity*1 of mental states to he that they
perform the function of guiding the body. We are placing "inter-
est" in the mental contents. The "body acts " teleologically"
, "is
governed by its interest", in the sense that the contents * select*
from the body adjustments that maKe for further adjustments.
But does professor .perry mean by "grouping and "pattern 1
the continuum of things that are changing teleoiogically? There is
much to indicate that he does not. he tells us that he uses" in-
terest "in a biological rather than in psychological sense. The
three components of mind, he finally reduces to two, combining
"activity" and "interest" in the term "activity", the latter having'
reference to the functioning of the physical body. And this seems
to indicate that the "contents" ape wholly passive, and that the
body is that part of "mind' 1 which has the distinction of acting.
And again his insistence that "what such an aggregate (i.e. things
experienced) derives from consciousness is its aggregation and
no more, 1,1 seems to indicate that the aggregation is additive
rather than being the very woof and web of the "aggregate". And,
finally, the fact that he finds that the very nature of "mind" ar-
gues the independence of objects is proof positive that he does
not mean by "grouping 1'' the cooperative functioning of body and
environment. The latter Kind of grouping does not lead us to
independence.
What then, is his grouping, the grouping that leads to in-
dependence? And is that Kind of grouping tenaole? There is a forn
1
Ibid, p. 325.

of grouping which things have in relation to the physical "body, that
can be observed oy anyone who will taKe the time to watch the be-
havior of a physical body. From my window I see a man walking down
the street. He reacts now to one section of the walk and now djo
another, in this way I see his "body selecting out parts of a larger
environment. Now at times as we read Professor Perry 1 s account we
are inclined to thinK that it is this Kind of grouping with which
he proposes to identify consciousness. And if consciousness is
merely a matter of a body's reacting to specific parts of its en-
vironment, then the independence of oojects may be gotten, just as
he says, from observing what actually transpires. But independence
in that sense, does not need to be argued for; there is no point in
telling one that environment and body reacting to environment are
distinguishable.
••Consciousness is a selective response to a pre-existigg
and independently existing environment
.
1,1 But see what it would
mean to taKe this statement at its face value. The body responds
to a multitude of things which are not experienced. Yes, it even
responds under the direction of its interests, i.e., its biologic!
interests, without that to which it responds being experienced.
Reflex action
and
so-c ailed conscious action are not differentiated
in this conception of consciousness.
Or does ±'rofessor ferry mean that the ^pattern" is in fche
environment? Does the bodily response merely given us a clue to
the "pattern" which the environment taxes on when it is experienced!'
1 Ibid
,
p.32*.
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Should the following passage be interpreted in that way: "A sub-
jective manifold will be any manifold whose inclusion and arrange-
ment; of contents can be attributed to the order and range of some
particular organism's response. The numoer of the planets, for
example, and their realtlve distances from the sun, cannot be so
accounted for; but the number of planets which I have seen, the
temporal order in which I have seen them, and their apparent dis-
tances, can be so accounted for"?
When he cites "perspective or point of view»as the clea«
est instance of the subjective manifold we are the more convinced
that the "pattern 11 is in the environment. Let us, then.taKe er-
spective under our consideration and see if we can discover just
what the "pattern which constitutes consciousness is, ana how it
maKes evident independent objects.
When I looK down the avenue, houses, treas, etc., spread
out from toy body in one manner, and when I walK its length they
group themselves ir another manner, and when 1 view the avenue from
my window they group themselves in still another manner. Now by
comparing these varying experiences of the avenue, I come to Know
that things have a perspective, that they group themselves in dif-
ferent ways relative to the different positions which my body, in
reacting to them, holds. But each of these "manifolds 11 I can "at-
tribute to the order and range of some particular organism's res-
ponse." Therefore, they are all "subjective manifolds". Then it
is not by contrasting a "subjective" wMh an "objective manifold-
that we are to learn the character of the "subjective 11 out rather
by UooKing at the"su bj ectlve"alone.
Now what is there in the character of such "manifolds- to
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indicate that they are projections abstracted from the plenum of
nature"
,
"nature"being understood as independent of experience?
Since we cannot answer this question we suspect that we have not
discove?*ed the principle of the grouping which constitutes conscinxusf
ness. If the manifold which constitutes consciousness argues inde-
pendence then we should agree with Professor Mc Gl ivary 1 that M the
spiritual and temporal centers of experience are not merely spatial
and temporal centers; they are spatial and temporal centers of a
relatiional complex which has a distinctive character given to it by
the fact that it is a conscious relational complex." 1
But if we are to accept the doctrine of independence,- the
"distinctive character" of the conscious relational complex' must be
made clear to us. Professor perry acKnowledges that the advocates
of a relational consciousness have failed to show what the principle
of the relation or grouping is. His own work is an attempt to over-
come that short coming of his school. But has he succeeded in the
tasK he has undertaKen? He tells us that we can find the distinct-
ive character of the group of consciousness by watching the behavior
of the body. But this method, as we have tried to show, does not
bring to light any thing distinctive as regards consciousness, when
we study the environment we also fail to find the grouping that
"abstracts from the planum of nature." In conclusion, then, we are
not yet convinced of the independence of objects.
ipe started out to find where the realist's program and our
own diverge. We are inclined to think that the turning of the
roads is the passivity of the environment. For the realist the
physical body alone selects; while we are contending that the en-
1 Philosophical Review. Vol. XXI, p. 164,

vironment also selects, that it chooses specific co-ordinations
from the range of the body's ways of acting. When the body selects
it becomes hopelessly involved and controlled by what it selects,
according to our view. We taKe it as literally true that the body
cannot see an object without also undertaKing to grasp it.
But suppose we taKe the environment as passive. Would we
suspect, even for a moment, that It was independent? If a con-
verging avenue did not carry itself over to an avenue of long
straight lines, as our weary bodies travel its length, we do not
Know how the identity of the avenue, in this shift of contexts,
would be maintained. And if the avenue having oeen converging
and having become straight, did not further become, when we stretch
ourselves in the philosopher's arm-chair, an avenue which proclaims
its two contexts, we do not Know how the realist, could tell us
that things, visually perceived, have a perspective, and how we
could answer the realist, as we do, M yea» verily", if the en-
vironment is passive without thereby hindering us from Knowing
its independence, then there must be in the maKe-up of mind some-
thing besides "activity and "contents . The "innocent bystander-
incarnate, alone, maKes tanable the doctrine of independence. Which
then shall we choose, - thorough-going realism, or thorough-going
relativity?
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